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BOUND & GAGGED:                                    
POTENTIAL FIRST AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGES TO “AG-GAG” LAWS 
JESSALEE LANDFRIED† 
In an effort to stifle undercover investigations of factory farms, the 
agricultural industry has pushed forward a slate of bills that limit audio 
and video recording on farms. This Note describes the different types 
of “ag-gag” bills legislators have proposed across the nation, and 
evaluates potential First Amendment challenges to the bills. The Note 
concludes that the ag-gag laws most likely to pass do not obviously 
implicate First Amendment rights and advises activists to plan their 
investigations in anticipation of future legal challenges. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a series of undercover videos have exposed 
shocking animal abuses and unsanitary practices at factory farms 
across the country. One 2011 video showed employees at a Texas 
cattle farm bashing cows’ heads with pickaxes.1 Another, filmed in 
2009 at a Vermont slaughterhouse, showed a worker pouring water 
on a downed calf’s head to increase the electric current as he shocked 
the calf again and again.2 In California, a 2008 video showed workers 
pushing downed cows with a forklift to force them to stand for 
 
         †       J.D. Candidate at Duke University School of Law and a M.E.M. Candidate at Duke’s 
Nicholas School for the Environment. I am grateful for the assistance of Zachary Kolodin and 
Michelle Nowlin in reviewing early drafts of this Note. 
 1.  Lester Aldrich, Texas Sheriff Investigates Animal-Cruelty Video Rattling Cattle Market, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704658704576 
275091620222926.html?mod=googlenews_wsj; Kevin Lewis, Charges Filed in E6 Cattle Case, 
PLAINVIEW HERALD (May 26, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.myplainview.com/news/article_ 
5ee448d4-87e0-11e0-be0a-001cc4c03286.html. 
 2.  John Curran, 2 Vt. Slaughterhouse Workers Charged with Cruelty, BOS. GLOBE (June 
4, 2010), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/06/04/2_vt_slaughterhouse_workers_ 
charged_with_cruelty. 
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inspection.3 The workers then subjected the cattle to a “veterinary 
version of waterboarding” by shooting high-intensity water sprays up 
their noses.4  
The abuses in Texas and Vermont both led to criminal charges 
against the farm operators and the employees who perpetrated the 
violent acts.5 The California video led not only to criminal charges of 
animal abuse, but also to the largest meat recall in U.S. history: 143 
million pounds of beef—the meatpacker’s entire production for two 
years—were recalled.6 
These exposés impose high costs on the meat industry in the 
form of litigation, recalls, and lost sales.7 To shut off this costly flow of 
undercover videos, politicians across the nation have recently pushed 
forward a series of anti-whistleblower bills known as “ag-gag” laws.8 
Although they can take different forms, the ag-gag bills all work to 
severely limit documentation of agricultural activities.9 Three states 
have had similar laws on the books since the 1990s, although they 
were seemingly uncontroversial when passed and are rarely, if ever, 
applied.10 But between 2011 and 2013, legislative interest in ag-gag 
 
 3.  Rick Weiss, Video Reveals Violations of Laws, Abuse of Cows at Slaughterhouses, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2008, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/01/29/AR2008012903054.html. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Mark Bittman, Op-Ed., Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, at A27, 
available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals; Curran, 
supra note 2. 
 6.  David Brown, USDA Orders Largest Meat Recall in U.S. History, WASH. POST, Feb. 
18, 2008, at A1. 
 7.  GLYNN T. TONSOR & NICOLE J. OLYNK, KAN. STATE UNIV., U.S. MEAT DEMAND: 
THE INFLUENCE OF ANIMAL WELFARE MEDIA COVERAGE (2010), available at 
http://www.agmanager.info/livestock/marketing/animalwelfare/MF2951.pdf (finding that media 
reports significantly reduce demand for pork and poultry products). 
 8.  Food writer Mark Bittman coined the term “ag gag” in a New York Times editorial.  
See Bittman, supra note 5. The term is now widely used to describe laws that limit 
photographing or video recording of agricultural facilities. 
 9.  Although the undercover investigations targeted by the bills all took place at livestock 
facilities, many of the bills are specifically drafted so as to cover both animal and crop 
production facilities. For example, Iowa’s new law defines “agricultural production facility” to 
include “an animal facility . . . and a crop production facility.”  H.R. 589, 84th Gen. Assemb. 
(Iowa 2012). 
 10.  Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota passed ag-gag laws in the 1990s. See KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 47-1827 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02 
(2011). 
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bills exploded. Legislators in sixteen states introduced ag-gag bills.11 
So far, only Iowa and Utah successfully enacted the bills,12 but ag-gag 
laws remain pending in nine states. Despite this relatively low success 
rate, more and more state legislators are proposing ag-gag bills. Two 
bills were introduced in 2011, six in 2012, and nine in 2013.13  
This Note provides an overview of ag-gag bills in the context of 
the First Amendment. Are any of these ag-gag bills constitutional? If 
so, are some more likely to pass constitutional muster than others? 
Part I provides an overview of applicable First Amendment doctrine. 
Part II examines the different forms taken by ag-gag laws across the 
nation and explores potential First Amendment challenges to the ag-
gag bills. Part II also touches on “animal terrorism” laws, which are 
not always included under the ag-gag umbrella, but can also be used 
to restrict documentation of farm activities. Part III proposes 
precautions undercover activists can take to protect themselves 
against the ag-gag laws.  
I. POTENTIAL FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO AG-GAG LAWS 
Opponents often assert that ag-gag bills are unconstitutional.14 
As Part II will explore, the accuracy of that assessment depends 
 
 11.  Nine states introduced ag-gag bills in 2013. See H.R. 0110, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 
2013); H.R. 0126, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); S. 373, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 
2013); S. 391, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013); Leg. 204, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. 
(Neb. 2013); S. 13, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); S. 14, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ark. 2013); H.R. 683, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2013); S. 1248, 108th 
Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2013); S. 552, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013); Assemb. 343, 2013–14 Reg. 
Sess. (Ca. 2013). Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, and 
Utah all considered ag-gag laws in 2011 and 2012.  See S. 1184, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Fla. 2012); H.R. 5143, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2012); S. 184, 117th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 
(Ind. 2012); Iowa H.R. 589 (2012); H.R. 1369, 87th Sess. (Minn. 2011); S. 695, 96th Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); Leg. 915, 102d Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2012); S. 5172, 235th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011); H.R. 187, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012).  This list is 
updated as of March 20, 2013. 
 12. IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (West 2012). 
 13.  See supra note 11. 
 14.  See, e.g., Jason Clayworth, Animal Rights Spokeswoman: ‘Ag Gag’ Won’t Stop Us!, 
DES MOINES REG., (Mar. 1, 2012), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/ 
2012/03/01/animals-rights-spokeswoman-ag-gag-wont-stop-us (“[Activists] contend the bill is a 
constitutional violation of free speech”); Dan Flynn, Iowa Approves Nation’s First ‘Ag-Gag’ 
Law, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/03/iowa-
approves-nations-first-ag-gag-law/ (“Many see HF589 as an unconstitutional infringement on 
First Amendment rights.”); Michelle Kretzer, Cloris Leachman Takes on ‘Ag Gag’, PETA FILES 
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.peta.org/b/thepetafiles/archive/2012/02/27/cloris-leachman-takes-on-
ag-gag.aspx (writing that PETA is “fighting back against this unconstitutional measure” in 
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greatly on the form of the bill. The content of the bills varies 
significantly from state to state. In general, though, the ag-gag bills 
can be roughly grouped into five categories. The specific 
characteristics of these bills will be explored in greater detail in Part 
II. In brief, each ag-gag bill is drafted to criminalize one of the 
following behaviors:  
 
 Filming any agricultural activities (often called bans on 
“agricultural interference”); 
 Employment fraud in agricultural settings; 
 Distribution of agricultural recordings;  
 Trespass in agricultural facilities; and  
 Delayed reporting of animal abuse. 
 
This Part examines four potential First Amendment challenges 
to these ag-gag laws: A) overbreadth; B) freedom of the press; C) 
presumption against content-based restrictions and prior restraints; 
and D) limitations on incidental restrictions. 
The strongest First Amendment challenges could be mounted 
against the broad “agricultural-interference” bills and those that limit 
distribution of recordings. However, because the other approaches to 
ag-gag laws intentionally evade issues of speech and expression, they 
will be much more difficult to challenge under the First Amendment.  
A. Overbreadth 
A law violates the First Amendment for overbreadth if “a 
substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in 
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”15 A 2010 Supreme 
Court case, United States v. Stevens,16 provides the most apt precedent 
in the ag-gag context. Stevens applied the overbreadth doctrine to 
invalidate a statute banning the creation and sale of depictions of 
harm to animals.17 A First Amendment defense against ag-gag bills 
 
Utah); Nathan Runkle, Video: CNN Covers Iowa “Ag-Gag” Law Debate, MFA BLOG (Mar. 7, 
2012), http://www.mfablog.org/2012/03/video-cnn-covers-iowa-ag-gag-law-debate.html 
(describing animal rights commentators as addressing the “unconstitutional nature of the bill”). 
 15.  Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008) 
(quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–71 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16.  130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010). 
 17.  Id. at 1592; 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006). 
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based on Stevens may not be as strong as some observers have 
implied, however.18 
Congress passed the statute at issue in Stevens in reaction to 
“crush” films, a genre of sexual-fetish films that depict animals being 
killed, usually by being stepped on.19 However, the statute more 
broadly criminalized both the creation and sale of depictions of any 
harm to animals (with the stipulation that the depicted conduct must 
also be illegal in the jurisdiction where the depiction was made, sold, 
or possessed).20 Emphasizing the possibility that the statute could be 
construed to ban otherwise protected activities,21 the Court struck it 
down for overbreadth.22 
Like the statute at issue in Stevens, some ag-gag bills (particularly 
the agricultural-interference type) are written so broadly as to 
criminalize otherwise protected activities. For example, a Wyoming 
bill would find a person guilty of “interference with an agricultural 
operation” if they “knowingly or intentionally [record] an image or 
sound from the agricultural operation by concealing or placing a 
recording device on the premises of the agricultural operation” 
without the consent of the owner.23 
These bills could be construed to ban legally permissible 
activities like employees taking pictures at work or a tourist taking a 
picture of a bucolic farm scene. Courts therefore have a strong basis 
to find that the agricultural interference ag-gag laws are 
unconstitutionally overbroad. 
However, critical differences between undercover activist films 
and the films addressed in Stevens may weaken Stevens’ precedential 
 
 18.  See, e.g., Mickey H. Osterreicher, Photography & the Law: New Laws Have Significant 
Impact, JPG MAG (Mar. 11, 2012), http://jpgmag.com/news/2012/03/new-laws-have-significant-
impact-on-photographyrecording.html (noting that Stevens spurred some legislatures’ changes 
to ag-gag proposals); Amanda Peterka, State Legislatures Take Up Bills Barring Undercover 
Videos of Confined Animal Feeding Operations, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/05/05greenwire-state-legislatures-take-up-bills-barring-
under-88103.html?scp=4&sq=ag%20gag&st=cse (noting that ag-gag laws could “run afoul of 
United States v. Stevens”). 
 19.  Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583. The defendant in Stevens was not a producer of crush films, 
but sold videos of dogfights. Id. at 1583. 
 20.  Id. at 1582. 
 21.  Id. at 1588–89 (stating that a film could be in violation of the statute if it was made in a 
state that allowed a certain type of hunting and was then sold in another state that prohibited 
that type of hunting). 
 22.  Id. at 1592. 
 23.  H.R. 0126, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013). 
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value in this context. Activists planning to challenge ag-gag laws 
based on the case should remain aware of three major distinctions. 
First, the statute in question in Stevens is distinguishable from the 
proposed ag-gag laws because it foreclosed the sale of depictions of 
harm done to animals.24  Undercover activist films are not for sale but 
are distributed free of charge to educate the public and spur political 
change. Agricultural activists’ films would therefore not have been 
within the purview of that statute. Some courts may find that this 
fundamental difference renders the Stevens precedent inapplicable to 
the ag-gag context.25 
Second, the Stevens holding is quite limited. Stevens does not 
hold that the First Amendment protects depictions of animal cruelty.26 
Much more narrowly, it holds that the statute in question was too 
broad. The Court specifically declined to reach the question of 
whether a more precise statute banning depictions of certain types of 
animal cruelty could be constitutional.27 The case therefore does not 
protect undercover activists’ films on the basis of their content. 
Lastly, ag-gag videos are filmed in secrecy, without the 
permission of the private property owner. Crush films, dogfighting 
films, and hunting videos are more likely to be filmed with the 
property owner’s permission because their goal is to make money, not 
to expose the property owner’s unsavory practices. Property rights 
are thus heavily implicated in the ag-gag bills, but they were not at all 
addressed in Stevens.  
These distinctions indicate that Stevens may not be squarely 
applicable to ag-gag laws. The differences between undercover 
activist films and the types of films contemplated in Stevens may be 
potent enough for some courts to decline to rely on Stevens to strike 
down ag-gag laws. 
Of the proposed ag-gag bills, the agricultural interference type is 
the most undermined by the overbreadth doctrine. As with the 
statute addressed in Stevens, the agricultural interference bills are so 
 
 24.  See 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006). 
   25.  Activists could consider charging a nominal fee for their videos in order to trigger 
Stevens applicability. Exploring this interesting possibility is unfortunately outside of the scope 
of this Note. 
 26.  Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583–84.  However, the Court does state in dicta that depictions 
of animal cruelty should not be categorically denied First Amendment protection like 
defamation or obscenity.  Id. at 1584. 
 27.  Id. at 1592. 
Landfried (Do Not Delete) 5/19/2013  10:45 PM 
Spring 2013] FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO “AG-GAG” LAWS 383 
broadly drafted as to have the potential to criminalize otherwise 
protected speech. As will be discussed below, although this type of 
bill is fairly common, none has yet been enacted into law. If such a bill 
were enacted, its extremely broad nature would likely render it 
vulnerable to First Amendment challenges based on Stevens’ 
precedent.  
B. Freedom of the Press 
Undercover activist films have more in common with journalism 
than they do with crush films or hunting videos. They seek to expose 
an important, hidden truth to the public by using secret information-
gathering techniques. Undercover journalism has an ambiguous 
constitutional foundation, however. There is no conclusive Supreme 
Court ruling or circuit court consensus on the newsgathering rights of 
the press, not to mention the murky territory of citizen journalism. 
Courts have been careful to avoid categorical determinations about 
journalists’ liability for undercover recording.28 For example, in 
Sanders v. American Broadcasting Co.,29 the California Supreme 
Court held that a psychic who had been secretly filmed at work could 
recover for the tort of intrusion, even though the defendant reporters 
did uncover her unethical behavior.30 The court specifically said, 
however, that it did not “hold or imply that investigative journalists 
necessarily commit a tort by secretly recording events.”31 Given the 
unclear status of undercover reporting, it is difficult to predict how 
courts would treat animal-rights activists’ undercover filming, even 
without ag-gag laws on the books. 
This Section will explore these ambiguities and highlight two 
main lessons that may be drawn from the case law: 1) the First 
Amendment does not provide immunity to journalists against civil or 
criminal charges following undercover investigations; and 2) news 
outlets’ distribution of accurate information is strongly protected by 
the First Amendment, depending to some extent on how the 
information was obtained. 
 
 28.  Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right To Gather News: A Sequential Interpretation of the 
First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 121 (2008). 
 29.  987 P.2d 67 (Cal.1999). 
 30.  Id. at 77. 
 31.  Id. at 69. 
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1. No Journalistic Immunity 
The First Amendment does not free undercover investigators 
from civil or criminal liability, even if they ultimately produce an 
accurate video that serves the public good. The Supreme Court has 
made clear that the First Amendment does not provide the press with 
limitless protection against prosecution for breaking the law in the 
course of journalistic endeavors.32 Reporters’ First Amendment 
defenses have been rejected in cases involving both undercover and 
open investigations, for crimes including trespass,33 harassment,34 
disorderly conduct,35 and fraud.36 
Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,37 a Fourth Circuit case 
following the high-profile exposé of unsanitary practices at Food Lion 
grocery stores, provides insight into how courts analyze charges 
against undercover journalists. In Food Lion, two ABC reporters 
obtained employment at two different Food Lion grocery store 
outlets, where they secretly filmed other employees handling meat.38 
The footage showed employees “repackaging and redating fish that 
had passed the expiration date, grinding expired beef with fresh beef, 
and applying barbeque sauce to chicken past its expiration date in 
order to mask the smell and sell it as fresh in the gourmet food 
section.”39 The court addressed claims of fraud, trespass, and breach 
of loyalty against the two undercover reporters responsible for the 
 
 32.  See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991). 
 33.  See, e.g., Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 256 A.2d 131, 131 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1998) (holding that an undercover reporter posing as a potential patient in a private 
medical office had no First Amendment affirmative defense because free speech did not confer 
a privilege for trespass); Stahl v. State, 665 P.2d 839, 840–42 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (holding 
that newspersons who accompanied trespassing protestors onto the grounds of a proposed 
nuclear facility were not shielded by the First Amendment from state criminal prosecution in 
their news gathering function). 
 34.  See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the First 
Amendment did not shield a paparazzo photographer from criminal liability for his constant 
surveillance of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, despite her status as a public figure). 
 35.  See, e.g., Oak Creek v. King, 436 N.W.2d 285, 286 (Wis. 1989) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not provide news gatherers with special rights of access as surrogates for the 
general public). 
 36.  See, e.g., Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 793–94 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an undercover reporter who secretly filmed abuses at a facility for 
mentally retarded persons was not protected by the First Amendment against tort claims for 
fraud or trespass). 
 37.  194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 38.  Id. at 510. 
 39.  Id. at 511. 
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investigation and found that the First Amendment did not bar the 
claims.40 
The truth of the reporters’ allegations and the accuracy of the 
footage were not at issue in the litigation. Food Lion did not sue for 
defamation, but rather relied on traditional tort claims.41 Based 
mostly on state law in North Carolina and South Carolina, the court 
held that the ABC employees breached their duty of loyalty to their 
employer, Food Lion, and committed trespass.42 ABC attempted to 
argue that the First Amendment barred the plaintiffs’ recovery, but 
the court disagreed.43  
Notably, however, although the court found ABC guilty, it 
awarded Food Lion a mere $2 in damages.44 Other courts may 
similarly treat journalists’ offenses leniently when the information 
exposed by their undercover investigations is of significant social 
value. 
The plaintiffs’ approach in Food Lion is representative of a trend 
over the last fifteen years where, “[b]y targeting the media’s 
newsgathering behavior, plaintiffs have—with mixed success—
avoided the formidable constitutional shield that protects media 
expression.”45 The most successful ag-gag approach—banning 
agricultural-employment fraud—fits well within this trend. 
In sum, the importance of activists’ documentary footage does 
not provide protection against prosecution for civil or criminal 
violations, with or without ag-gag laws on the books. 
2. Strong Protection for News Outlets’ Distribution of Footage 
News institutions benefit from strong First Amendment 
protection for publishing accurate information. The extent of this 
protection depends somewhat on whether the information was 
gathered illegally, and the extent to which the publishing institution 
was complicit in that illegality. News institutions cannot be punished 
for publishing information they obtain lawfully, even if their source is 
 
 40.  Id. at 511, 520. 
 41.  Id. at 510. 
 42.  Id. at 516. 
 43.  Id. at 520–21. 
 44.  Id. at 524. The jury initially awarded $5.5 million in compensatory and punitive 
damages, which was reduced by the trial court judge to $316,400 in total damages. Id. at 511. 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and limited the damages to $2. Id. at 524. 
 45.  Ugland, supra note 28, at 131. 
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a third party who acquired it illegally. Further, the news institution’s 
awareness that a third party acquired the information illegally does 
not negate First Amendment protection.46 For example, in Bartnicki 
v. Vopper, the Supreme Court held that a radio program was 
protected by the First Amendment in disclosing the contents of an 
illegally intercepted phone conversation about the local teachers’ 
union, even though the program had reason to know that the tapes 
were illegally intercepted.47 The Court held that “a stranger’s illegal 
conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from 
speech about a matter of public concern.”48 
There is little guidance, however, on the extent to which news 
institutions are protected when they are complicit in illegal 
newsgathering. The Court’s decision to protect the radio broadcast in 
Bartnicki was influenced by the fact that the hosts were not complicit 
in the unlawful acquisition of the tapes.49 The Court avoided making a 
broader determination as to whether publication would have been 
forbidden had the radio program been complicit.50 Other courts have 
not barred publication when the newsgathering institution was 
engaged in illegal activity. For example, in both Sanders and Food 
Lion, ABC News orchestrated and supervised the undercover 
filmmaking.51 In both cases, however, ABC was punished not for 
publication of the illegally acquired footage, but rather for the torts 
committed in the process of gathering the footage.52 In Food Lion, the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that Food Lion 
could not recover publication damages because “it was [Food Lion’s] 
food handling practices themselves—not the method by which they 
were recorded or published—which caused the loss of consumer 
confidence.”53 
The case law demonstrates that news outlets that publish 
accurate undercover investigations benefit from very strong First 
Amendment protections. However, the cases’ applicability to 
 
 46.  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18, 528 (2001). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 535. 
 49.  See id. at 532 n.19. 
 50.  Id. at 528–29. 
 51.  See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999); 
Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 70 (Cal. 1999). 
 52.  See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 510; Sanders, 978 P.2d at 70. 
 53.  Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522. 
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undercover citizen activists is unclear. There are no settled legal 
definitions of “journalism” or “journalists,” which are complex terms 
in a time when bloggers break important news stories and passersby 
film significant events with cellphone cameras.54 At the very least, 
there is no consensus in the courts on whether citizen journalists 
should receive any of the protections typically afforded to 
professional journalists.55 The First Amendment thus leaves open 
significant questions for undercover activist filmmakers and the 
organizations that hire and support them, neither of which are 
traditional news institutions. Courts may be influenced by the fact 
that reporters are subject to professional standards and that their 
employers have an institutional interest in producing accurate 
journalism.56 If future jurisprudence better defines the role of citizen 
journalists, suits filed against activists under ag-gag laws will be 
significantly affected.57 
In sum, the First Amendment does not clearly protect ag-gag 
filmmakers, but does strongly protect news institutions that distribute 
their films, as long as the films are accurate. To the filmmakers 
themselves, the First Amendment may be most helpful on the back 
end, once undercover films have been distributed and litigation has 
been pursued against the activists. At that point, there is a strong 
likelihood that courts will treat activists leniently if they have created 
truthful videos that depict information of value to the public. It is, of 
course, less than ideal to rely on potential leniency as protection. Part 
III will propose precautionary measures activists can take to protect 
themselves. 
 
 54.  See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 515, 518 (2007). 
 55.  See discussion of the first amendment protections for professional journalists infra Part 
I.C. 
 56.  The Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics states that journalists should 
avoid undercover investigations unless the information gathered is 1) vital to the public and 2) 
not available through other means. SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, 
http://www.spj.org/pdf/ethicscode.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
 57.  Courts are tentatively beginning to address this thorny issue. In a 2006 case, the 
California Court of Appeal held that website editors were entitled to the protections of 
California’s reporter’s privilege shield law. O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 77 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
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C. Presumption Against Content-Based Restrictions and Prior 
Restraints 
News institutions, journalists, and citizen activists are all 
protected by a strong presumption against the validity of laws that 
impose content-based restrictions on speech or any prior restraints on 
speech.58 
Content-based restrictions on speech regulate subject matter or 
viewpoint.59 They are presumptively invalid,60 and subject to strict-
scrutiny review.61  To overcome this presumption, the burden is on the 
government to prove that the content-based statute is the least 
restrictive means to promote a compelling government interest.62 
Content-neutral regulations of the time, place, or manner of speech 
are held to intermediate scrutiny and are therefore more likely to be 
constitutional, particularly if they leave open acceptable alternative 
methods of communication.63 
Of the different types of ag-gag bills, the agricultural-interference 
laws and distribution limitations are the most likely to be struck down 
as unconstitutional, content-based restrictions. The agricultural-
interference bills would enact broad bans against filming in 
agricultural settings.64 Arguably, therefore, these types of bills ban 
films based on their subject matter—agricultural activities—and 
should be subject to the strict scrutiny review applicable to content-
based restrictions. On the other hand, bill proponents would likely 
argue that the prohibitions are actually content-neutral because they 
are based on the place, not the subject, of the films. Even if a court 
agreed, these types of laws might not hold up to intermediate scrutiny 
given that they do not leave open any alternative method of 
communicating the same information.  
 
 58.  See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 
(1980) (“[W]hen regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental action must be 
scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited ‘merely 
because public officials disapprove the speaker’s views.’” (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 
U.S. 268, 282 (1951))). 
 59.  See Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 199 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 60.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 61.  Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009). 
 62.  Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665 (2004). 
 63.  See Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 536 (providing the example that regulating traffic noise 
is content-neutral because “[n]o matter what its message, a roving sound truck that blares at 2 a. 
m. disturbs neighborhood tranquility”). 
 64.  See discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
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As for the bills that impose limits on distribution of recordings 
made on agricultural premises, these are likewise content-based 
because they impose restrictions based on the same agricultural 
content as the agricultural-interference films.65  
Additionally, neither type of bill serves a compelling government 
purpose. Indeed, these bills more likely restrict a compelling 
government interest in public access to information relating to food 
safety and animal cruelty. These ag-gag laws therefore are unlikely to 
survive a strict-scrutiny test and would be held unconstitutional. 
Some content-based ag-gag bills might also be invalid under the 
doctrine of prior restraints,66 which imposes a strong presumption 
against bans on expression of ideas prior to their publication.67 The 
Supreme Court has called prior restraints “the most serious and the 
least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights,” noting that 
they can be most damaging when they “fall[] upon the 
communication of news and commentary on current events.”68 
Ag-gag laws that ban distribution of films made in agricultural 
settings are clear examples of unconstitutional prior-restraint laws. By 
prohibiting distribution of audio and video recordings, they 
essentially institute a before-the-fact ban on publication. These types 
of bills would therefore impose a prior restraint and are thus 
presumptively invalid. 
D. Limits on Incidental Restrictions of Speech 
In some cases, regulations that do not directly address speech but 
in practice function to limit expressive conduct can be found 
unconstitutional. These “incidental restrictions” are unconstitutional 
if they are “greater than necessary to further a substantial 
governmental interest.”69 In contrast to content-based restrictions, 
incidental restrictions need not be the least intrusive means of 
achieving a compelling governmental interest to pass constitutional 
 
   65. See discussion infra Part II.C.3. 
 66.  DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 17 (Cal. 2003) (“[A] prior restraint is a 
content-based restriction on speech prior to its occurrence.” (quoting Planned Parenthood 
Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams, 873 P.2d 1224, 1230 (Cal. 1994)). 
 67.  See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 733 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting) (“[E]very man 
shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever, without 
any prior restraint . . . .”). 
 68.  Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
 69.  S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 (1987). 
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muster. Rather, they need only promote “a substantial governmental 
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the 
regulation.”70 
The most successful ag-gag bills—those criminalizing 
agricultural-employment fraud—place incidental restrictions on 
speech.71 They do not directly limit expression, but instead institute a 
rule that will have that effect in application. Likewise, bills that 
impose reporting time limits or redefine trespass would place 
incidental restrictions on speech.72 Although they do not directly 
regulate speech, they impose prohibitions which have the practical 
effect of chilling speech. However, because incidental restrictions are 
not held to as strict of a standard as content-based regulations, these 
laws are much more likely to be considered constitutional. For 
example, the Supreme Court held that a National Park Service 
regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks was constitutional, 
even when it had the effect of prohibiting demonstrators from 
sleeping in parks to make a political statement about homelessness.73 
The Court found that the incidental restriction on the protestors’ 
freedom of expression did not violate the First Amendment because 
the regulation was content-neutral and was narrowly focused on a 
substantial governmental interest in maintaining parks “in an 
attractive and intact condition.”74 
A successful challenge to the ag-gag bills that pose incidental 
restrictions on speech will hinge on whether the government can 
demonstrate its substantial interest. State governments can probably 
meet this relatively low bar: the government arguably has a 
substantial interest in transparent hiring practices, protecting private 
property, and ensuring timely reporting of animal abuses. However, 
these arguments ring false because the “incidental” restrictions are 
not at all incidental. They are deliberately crafted to limit expression. 
Perhaps courts attuned to the context of these bills’ passage and to 
the strong evidence that they were designed to evade First 
 
 70.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–99 (1989) (quoting United States v. 
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). 
   71. See discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
   72. See discussion infra Part II.C.4–5. 
 73.  Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984). 
 74.  Id. at 296. 
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Amendment issues75 would be more willing to strike down these laws. 
Ultimately, given that agricultural-employment fraud laws are the 
only ag-gag bills that have successfully passed, incidental-restraint 
challenges might be activists’ best hope. 
II. AG-GAG LAWS ACROSS AMERICA 
This Part will provide context for the current legislative wave of 
ag-gag bills by examining the older generation of ag-gag laws passed 
in the 1990s, and outlining the features of existing animal-terrorism 
laws. It will then describe five general categorizations for the 
proposed and enacted ag-gag bills and discuss the hostile public 
opposition to the new slate of bills.  
A. Existing Ag-Gag Laws: Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota 
Since 1990, Kansas has prohibited anyone from entering an 
“animal facility” to make audio or video recordings “with the intent 
to damage the enterprise.”76 By requiring intent to damage (not 
included in any of the newly proposed ag-gag bills), the law is 
ambiguous as to whether it covers undercover activists’ filmmaking. 
Most likely, intent to damage does not include intent to reduce a 
farm’s profits by exposing unsanitary conditions. While the relevant 
chapter of Kansas’s code does not directly define “damage,”77 it does 
include a provision for civil penalties that describes damages in more 
detail.78 According to that provision, persons harmed by violations of 
the code can collect civil penalties for all “actual and consequential 
damages,” defined as “costs directly related to the field crop or 
animal that has been damaged or destroyed.”79 Losses resulting from 
negative publicity from an undercover video would arguably not be 
“directly related” to the farm operations, and no animal would have 
been “damaged or destroyed.” 
If courts interpret “damage” more broadly, however, undercover 
films could fall under the statute’s purview. Activists typically make 
 
 75.  See, e.g., Clayworth, supra note 14 (citing Senate Democratic Leader Michael Gronstal 
who said that lawmakers consulted Iowa’s Attorney General when crafting the bill to avoid 
legal challenges); Osterreicher, supra note 18 (citing the Stevens precedent as the impetus for 
some legislatures to change the drafting of their bills). 
 76.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827 (2006). 
 77.  See id. § 47-1826. 
 78.  See id. § 47-1828. 
 79.  Id. 
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audio and video recordings with a variety of goals, including spurring 
criminal investigations, reducing consumption of meat products, and 
sparking public outrage at the facilities depicted. Those actions are 
intentionally targeted to financially harm the enterprises, which could 
arguably be considered “damage” under the law. Ultimately, 
however, given that the Kansas code defines “damage” as requiring 
costs directly related to code violations, it is more likely that courts 
will interpret “damage” in a way that requires direct harm, and 
undercover activists’ filmmaking would likely not be punishable 
under the statute. 
North Dakota’s ag-gag law, passed in 1991, forbids the act of 
filming or photographing an animal facility without consent of the 
owner or operator, regardless of intent and without reference to 
damage.80 
Montana’s statute, also enacted in 1991, requires that the 
offender enter the property “with the intent to commit criminal 
defamation.”81 In Montana, communication of defamatory 
information is justified if the information is true.82 The requirement 
that offenders must intend to distribute untrue information sets 
Montana’s law apart from the other existing and proposed ag-gag 
laws. No farm targeted by recent undercover activist films has 
seriously protested the accuracy of footage taken on its premises. 
Montana’s statute therefore does not criminalize the undercover 
production of activist films, as long as the footage is accurate. 
None of these existing laws appear to have been challenged in 
court, nor did an online search reveal any charges filed based on these 
statutes.83 Additionally, no activist films appear to have been created 
in any of these three states.84 These laws therefore provide little 
insight into potential paths for challenging ag-gag legislation, and 
perhaps also indicate that such legislation does have a chilling effect 
 
 80.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02 (2011). 
 81.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103 (2011). 
 82.  Id. § 45-8-212(3)(a). 
 83.  Based on a Westlaw search as of March 23, 2013. 
 84.  Based on extensive online searches, including online searches of animal rights groups’ 
archives. 
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on journalistic investigations. The proposed legislation is already 
bringing new scrutiny to these rarely used statutes.85 
B. Animal-Terrorism Laws: State and Federal 
In addition to the ag-gag laws dating to the 1990s, another set of 
enacted legislation could also limit activists’ ability to document 
abuses on farms. Generally known as animal-terrorism laws, these 
statutes are typically geared towards stopping the most aggressive 
types of animal rights activism, such as unauthorized release of 
laboratory animals and vandalizing animal facilities.86 Minnesota 
passed the first such law in 1988, and now at least seven other states 
have enacted similar laws.87 
Many of these state laws were spurred by the 2006 adoption of 
the federal Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA).88 While not 
principally geared towards limiting documentation of farms, AETA 
and its state progeny could potentially be used to deliver that result. 
AETA forbids anyone with “the purpose of damaging or interfering 
with” an animal enterprise from causing the loss of “any real or 
personal property” of the enterprise or any person connected with it.89 
It also forbids conspiring to or attempting to cause such losses.90 
Under these laws, activists could be charged with “damaging” 
animal enterprises by distributing undercover films recorded on 
farms. The statute includes loss of profits in its definition of economic 
damages, which could be used to argue that film distribution caused 
“damage” to an enterprise.91 However, it also provides an exception 
for “any lawful economic disruption” caused by “reaction to the 
disclosure of information about an animal enterprise.”92 In states with 
ag-gag laws, however, activists would no longer be acting lawfully, 
 
 85.  See, e.g., Dan Flynn, Five States Now Have ‘Ag-Gag’ Laws on the Books, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/03/five-states-now-have-ag-
gag-laws-on-the-books. 
 86.  Cynthia Hodges, Detailed Discussion of State Animal ‘Terrorism’/Animal Enterprise 
Interference Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR.  (2011), http://www.animallaw.info/articles/ 
ddusstateecoterrorism.htm. 
 87.  Id. (indicating that Florida, Illinois, Montana, South Carolina, Tennessee, Oklahoma, 
and Georgia all have some version of this type of law). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2006). 
 90.  Id. § 43(a)(2)(c). 
 91.  Id. § 43(d)(3). 
 92.  Id. § 43 (d)(3)(B) (emphasis added). 
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and therefore might lose the protection of this exception. Even 
without an ag-gag law on the books, a state might find that activists 
had violated any number of other laws—fraud, trespass, or breach of 
loyalty, for example—that might render their economic disruption 
unlawful. In sum, animal activists in states with and without ag-gag 
laws could still be found in violation of AETA. 
In March 2013, a federal district court found that a group of 
animal rights activists did not have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of AETA.93 The court found that the plaintiffs, all 
devoted animal rights activists, “failed to allege an objectively 
reasonable chill [on their speech], and, therefore, failed to establish 
an injury-in-fact.”94  
C. Proposed Ag-Gag Laws 
The recently proposed state bills take a variety of approaches to 
limiting audio and video recording inside agricultural facilities. This 
Section groups these approaches into five categories: 1) broadly 
banning all audio and video recording on farms as “agricultural 
interference”; 2) criminalizing employment fraud in agricultural 
settings; 3) forbidding distribution of recordings; 4) redefining 
trespass to specifically include agricultural facilities; and 5) requiring 
rapid reporting of animal abuse. As argued in Part I, broad bans on 
agricultural interference and bans on distribution of recordings face 
the strongest First Amendment challenges. 
1. Agricultural Interference 
Most of the proposed bills define a new offense of “agricultural 
interference.” These bills generally prohibit producing a sound or 
video recording at an agricultural or livestock facility without the 
owner’s consent.95 In some cases, these prohibitions are limited to 
recording devices which are left on the premises rather than being 
held and operated by a person.96 The first versions of Iowa’s97 and 
 
   93. Blum v. Holder, No. 11–12229–JLT, 2013 WL 1097818, at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 18, 2013). 
   94. Id. at *7. 
 95. S. 552, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013); H.R. 683, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Penn. 2013); H.R. 0126, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); H.R. 5143, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2012); 
S. 184, 117th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2012); H.R. 1369, 87th Sess. (Minn. 2011); S. 
5172, 235th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011) (the New York bill used the term 
“tampering” instead of “interference” but was otherwise the same as the others). 
   96.  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(a) (West 2012); Penn. H.R. 683. 
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Utah’s98 bills included this prohibition, but both were later amended 
to eliminate the broad prohibition against unauthorized recording 
(instead, they found success by focusing on agricultural fraud, 
described below).99  
The agricultural interference bills impose penalties ranging from 
misdemeanors to felonies, depending on the number of violations and 
the amount of financial damage caused by the release of 
information.100 In one 2011 proposal in Iowa, victims were also 
permitted to pursue civil damages up to three times “all actual and 
consequential” losses.101 In cases where lowered sales or a meat recall 
could be traced to publication of a disconcerting video, that provision 
could potentially impose massive costs on undercover filmmakers. 
This type of bill represents the broadest approach to ag-gag laws. 
As discussed above, because these laws could potentially implicate a 
wide range of otherwise innocent activities, they would likely face 
strong First Amendment challenges for overbreadth and content-
neutral restrictions.102 
2. Agricultural Fraud 
The two successful recent ag-gag bills approached the activist-
filmmaking issue by criminalizing “agricultural fraud.” This type of 
bill, passed in Iowa103 and Utah,104 and frequently proposed 
elsewhere,105 hampers activists by restricting their ability to gain 
employment on farms. Typically, the undercover videos are made 
when an animal rights group, such as the Humane Society, sends an 
activist to apply for employment at a target facility.106 The activist 
 
 97.  H.R. 589, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2011). 
 98.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(a). 
 99.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 100.  See bills cited supra note 11. 
 101.   Iowa H.R. 589 (2011). 
 102.  See supra Parts I.A, I.C. 
 103.  IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2012); H.R. 589, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2012). 
 104.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b) (2012). 
 105.  Leg. 204, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013) (banning making a “false statement or 
representation” to obtain agricultural employment if the false statement “intentionally causes 
economic damage”); H.R. 0126, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); S. 552, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 
2013); H.R. 5143, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2012); H.R. 1369, 87th Sess. (Minn. 2011). 
 106.  See, e.g., Cody Carlson, The Ag Gag Laws: Hiding Factory Farm Abuses from Public 
Scrutiny, ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/ 
2012/03/the-ag-gag-laws-hiding-factory-farm-abuses-from-public-scrutiny/254674 (describing 
 
Landfried (Do Not Delete) 5/19/2013  10:45 PM 
396 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIII:377 
works at the farm for a few weeks, obtaining footage, talking with 
other employees, and building a record of a pattern of abuse.107 If the 
employer asks the activist whether he or she is affiliated with an 
animal rights group, the activist needs to lie to continue the 
investigation.108 The agricultural-fraud bills therefore attack 
undercover investigations by outlawing deception in the employment 
context. 
Iowa’s successfully enacted ag-gag law criminalizes obtaining 
access to an agricultural facility by false pretenses, as well as 
intentionally making a false statement in an employment application 
with the intent to commit an unauthorized act at the facility.109 The 
law attempts to entirely evade First Amendment issues by not even 
mentioning audio or video recordings in the law.110 Instead, it focuses 
on employment procedures, providing a benign cover for its actual 
purpose—to block undercover investigations of farms.111 
Utah’s legislators also originally drafted their ag-gag bill 
pursuant to the broad “agricultural-interference” model,112 but they 
were only able to pass the bill after amending it to mainly address 
agricultural fraud (the law also includes a trespass provision, 
discussed below).113 Utah’s law, like Iowa’s, criminalizes obtaining 
employment in agricultural settings under false pretenses.114 It 
additionally criminalizes obtaining employment “with the intent to 
record an image of, or sound from, the agricultural operation” when 
on notice that the owner does not authorize recording.115 Thus, in 
contrast to Iowa, Utah’s agricultural fraud statute explicitly addresses 
audio and video recording.  
Following its successes in Iowa and Utah, the agricultural-fraud 
approach is likely to proliferate as other states’ legislators continue to 
introduce ag-gag laws. These laws can expand farm owners’ rights 
 
how the activist author applied to work at an egg farm in Iowa to produce video footage using a 
pinhole camera). 
 107.  See, e.g., id. 
 108.  See, e.g., id. 
 109.  H.R. 589, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2012). 
 110.  See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 106. 
 111.  See, e.g., id. 
 112.  H.R. 187, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012). 
 113.  H.R. 187 3d Substitute, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012). 
 114.  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b) (2012). 
 115.  Id. § 76-6-112(2)(c)(i) . 
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without explicitly addressing speech issues. This strategy helps evade 
constitutional issues. Unfortunately, for that reason, the employment 
fraud laws are less susceptible to challenges based on First 
Amendment grounds than the agricultural-interference and 
distribution bills.  
3. Crime to Distribute 
Some proposed bills criminalize possession and distribution of 
unauthorized agricultural recordings.116 For example, Indiana’s S.B. 
373 charges a person who “distributes, disseminates, or transfers” an 
unauthorized recording of an agricultural facility, if the recording was 
made “with intent to defame or directly or indirectly harm the 
business relationship between an agricultural operation and its 
customers.”117  
This type of restriction has huge implications for any news outlet, 
activist group, or individual that relies on the recordings for 
journalistic, educational, or persuasive purposes. These bills are so 
broadly drafted that the mere receipt of an email might constitute a 
violation. A website editor who publishes a video or photo on a 
website, in a media broadcast, or perhaps even on a personal blog or 
social media page, could be guilty of “distributing” the recording 
under the meaning of the bill.  
Going even further, Pennsylvania’s H.B. 683 bans “uploads, 
downloads, [and] transfers” of unauthorized recordings.118 Under such 
a law, any person who downloaded or shared a video that they 
themselves did not even make could be in violation of the statute. 
These bills could criminalize innocuous behavior, such as sending 
videos in personal emails, posting them to food safety blogs, and 
sharing videos via social media, even for people who played no role in 
producing the video. 
By criminalizing the publication of undercover farm videos, these 
bills blatantly seek to limit the public impact of the videos. The goal 
of the activists’ undercover activities is to widely distribute the 
footage and expose abusive and unsanitary practices at factory farms. 
By chilling the willingness of third parties to distribute the footage, 
 
 116.  H.R. 5143, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2012); H.R. 1369, 87th Sess. (Minn. 2011); H.R. 589, 
84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2011). 
 117.  S.B. 373, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013). 
 118.  H.R. 683, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Penn. 2013). 
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these bills result in the concealment of any incriminating evidence 
from the public. 
This type of ag-gag bill is likely to face strong First Amendment 
challenges because it is overly broad, and may limit otherwise 
protected speech.119 
4. Redefining Trespass 
In some states, legislators have focused on linking undercover 
recordings with trespass.120  
For example, Utah’s ag-gag law bans unauthorized recording 
“while . . . committing criminal trespass.”121 This trespass-related third 
prong of Utah’s agricultural-interference law is not a strong bar to 
undercover recording because Utah’s definition of criminal trespass 
does not clearly encompass activists’ video recordings. Utah defines 
criminal trespass as unlawfully entering or remaining on property and 
intending “to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to 
any property,” or entering the property unlawfully with the intent to 
commit a crime.122 Under this definition, undercover recording 
arguably does not constitute criminal trespass in Utah. The statute 
bans causing annoyance or injury “to any person,” and separately 
bans causing “damage to any property.”123 Animal activists’ films are 
not intended to cause annoyance or injury to any individual person, 
and they are not intended to cause damage to the agricultural 
property itself.124  
Activists will also be protected by the statutorily defined defense 
that an entrant’s conduct did not “substantially interfere with” the 
owner’s use of the property.125 By design, animal activists’ filming 
does not interfere with the owner’s use of the property. The filming is 
done in secret; if it substantially interfered with the owner’s use, it 
could not remain hidden. 
 
 119.  See supra Parts I.B., I.C. 
 120.  S. 552, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2013); S. 1184, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 
2012); H.R. 187 3d Substitute, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012); S. Amend. 3297, 84th Gen. Assemb. 
(Iowa 2011). 
 121.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(d) (West 2012). 
 122.  Id. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(i)–(ii). 
 123.  Id. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(i). 
 124.  See id. 
 125. Id. § 76-6-206(4)(b). 
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This type of law does not face strong First Amendment 
challenges because, like the agricultural-fraud laws, it evades issues of 
expression. 
5. Rapid Reporting of Abuses 
An increasingly popular approach is to propose ag-gag bills 
which are essentially disguised as animal protection statutes. These 
bills institute very short time limits in which animal abuse must be 
reported to enforcement authorities.126 Although these bills appear on 
their face to institute a protection against animal abuses, in practice 
they would function to limit the breadth and depth of activists’ 
undercover investigations. 
These bills would impose reporting windows from one to three 
days.127 By narrowing the window in which activists can record and 
report violations, the bill would severely limit the activists’ 
surveillance capacity. Undercover activists would have to launch an 
investigation knowing that they would be required to expose their 
investigation within one to three days of capturing any abuses. The 
time limitation would essentially bar activists from in-depth 
exploration of a facility’s practices, thereby crippling activists’ ability 
to develop a record of patterns of abuse and diluting the quality of 
the investigations.  
This approach is especially pernicious because it is easily 
couched as an effort to protect animals. The bills’ ultimate goal is to 
stifle undercover journalism in agricultural settings, but they can be 
pitched to the public as intended to ensure rapid prosecution of 
animal abusers.128 Animal-rights activists have not been fooled: they 
have clearly identified these bills as ag-gag efforts and included them 
 
 126.  See e.g., Assemb. 343, 2013–14 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2013); S. 1248, 108th Gen. Assemb. 
(Tenn. 2013); Leg. 204, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013) (requiring any person who “reasonably 
suspects” animal abuse to report it to authorities within twenty-four hours); H. 0110, 2013 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013) (establishing that any person who records “cruelty to livestock” shall 
have “a duty to report such activities to law enforcement authorities . . . within 24 hours of the 
recording’s creation”); H.R. 0126, 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); S. Amend. 3297, 84th Gen. 
Assemb. (Iowa 2011); S. 695. 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); Leg. 915, 102d Leg., 
2d Sess. (Neb. 2012); see also Iowa S. Amend. 3297 (providing that acting as a whistleblower can 
be an affirmative defense to a charge of agricultural trespass, but only to defendants who report 
abuses within 72 hours of witnessing them). 
 127.  See bills cited supra note 126. 
 128.  See Anti-Whistleblower Bills Hide Factory-Farming Abuses from the Public, THE 
HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/campaigns/factory_farming/ 
fact-sheets/ag_gag.html (last updated Apr. 16, 2013). 
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in their public action campaigns.129 Still, politicians may face an easier 
battle in justifying the bills to their constituents. Furthermore, this 
type of bill does not face strong First Amendment challenges. 
D. Hostile Opposition and Political Reframing 
The recent ag-gag bills have faced hostile public opposition in 
every state where they have been proposed.130 National animal-rights 
groups are focusing their organizing efforts on defeating these bills, 
and celebrities from Katherine Heigl131 to Bob Barker132 have voiced 
their opposition. The outrage has not come only from animal-rights 
activists. For example, in Minnesota, rural daily newspapers 
published a series of critical editorials pointing out that properly run 
farms have nothing to hide.133 
Presumably in response to this opposition, some legislatures are 
reframing their justifications for the bills. Introductory text to the 
New York bill explains that the bill’s purpose is to combat security 
problems at New York’s “family farms.”134 It cites crimes such as “the 
unlawful injection of cattle with antibiotics” and “theft of anhydrous 
ammonia fertilizer, utilized by meth addicts to make illegal 
substances.”135 The introductory text explains that “farmers need to 
be more aware of where their security weaknesses are” to 
“discourage trespass and tampering which may weaken the safety of 
 
 129.  See, e.g., id.; Ed Sayres, Ag-Gag Bills Threaten Our Children, Our Freedom and Our 
Animals, ASPCA BLOG (Mar. 22, 2012, 10:14 AM), http://www.aspca.org/ Blog/eds-corner-ag-
gag (referencing the ag-gag bills in Tennessee, Nebraska, and Missouri). 
 130. Interestingly, an internet search of local newspapers and animal rights activists’ 
websites indicates that the pre-existing laws in Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota were not 
controversial at the time of their passage. 
 131.  Sean P. Means, Heigl Lobbies Utah Senate Against ‘Ag-Gag’ Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB. 
(Mar. 1, 2012, 10:38 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/blogsmoviecricket/53625223-66/bill-utah-
gag-heigl.html.csp. 
 132.  Jeff Mackey, Bob Barker Addresses ‘Ag Gag’ Bill, PETA FILES (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://www.peta.org/b/thepetafiles/archive/2012/03/19/bob-barker-addresses-ag-gag-bill.aspx. 
 133.  See, e.g., Our View: Bill Just a Cover-Up of Bad Behavior, WINONA DAILY NEWS 
(Apr. 21, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.winonadailynews.com/news/opinion/editorial/ 
article_f2084c4c-6bce-11e0-844b-001cc4c002e0.html; Gary Anderson & Lee Smith, Exposing 
Animal Abuse Amounts to Petty Fraud, FAIRMONT SENTINEL (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://www.fairmontsentinel.com/page/content.detail/id/517182/Exposing-animal-abuse-
amounts-to-petty-fraud.html?nav=5005; Don’t Punish Whistleblowers, NEW ULM J. (Apr. 14, 
2011), http://www.nujournal.com/page/content.detail/id/523674/Don-t-punish-whistle 
blowers.html. 
 134.  Memo for S. 5172, 235th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011). 
 135.  Id. 
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our food supply.”136 Buried in the statutory text, a careful reader will 
find that “tampering” includes audio and video recording without the 
owner’s consent.137 
Given the outcry from the animal rights community, this textual 
trickery did not successfully hide the bill’s real goal of stifling activist 
penetration of farm operations.138 However, the bill’s reframing may 
indicate a strategy legislatures will pursue in the future. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR PROTECTING FURTHER UNDERCOVER 
ACTIVISM 
As explored in Part II, the First Amendment case against ag-gag 
bills is not bulletproof, especially considering that bills are more likely 
to pass in forms that avoid blatantly implicating First Amendment 
rights. 
Therefore, in addition to opposing enactment of the legislation, 
activists should plan their investigations so that they can best avoid 
liability. This Note offers three suggestions to activists: 1) avoid lying 
to the greatest extent possible in seeking employment on farms—use 
real names, addresses, and employment histories; 2) recruit current 
employees or professional journalists to document abuses; and 3) 
ensure that the legitimacy of any video is unquestionable. Activists 
should take these precautions even in states without ag-gag laws. 
First, activists should avoid lying as much as possible in seeking 
employment on farms. Because the First Amendment does not bar 
claims against undercover reporters,139 targeted farms will be able to 
press charges against activists for agricultural-employment fraud (in 
states with that type of ag-gag law) and traditional fraud (in states 
without ag-gag laws). Agricultural employers therefore have strong 
reasons to ask questions designed to create conditions of fraud for 
undercover activists. By asking, “Are you affiliated with an animal 
rights group?” or by requiring applicants to sign papers stating that 
they are not carrying any surveillance equipment, farm operators can 
lay the groundwork for claims of fraud against any person who lied on 
 
 136. Id. 
 137.  See S. 5172, 235th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011). 
 138.  See, e.g., Laura Allen, NY Bill to Ban Undercover Investigations, ANIMAL L. 
COALITION (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.animallawcoalition.com/animals-and-politics/ 
article/1805. 
 139.  See supra Part I.B. 
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their application. Farmers were already asking similar questions 
before the 2011 flood of ag-gag bills across the country. In 2010, an 
Iowa egg farm asked a Humane Society investigator, “Are you 
affiliated with a news organization, labor union, or animal protection 
group?”140 Under Iowa’s newly passed law, the investigator’s 
deceptive answer to that question could have garnered him a 
misdemeanor conviction.141 Activists obviously cannot answer such 
questions honestly if they wish to obtain employment on farms. 
However, they should use their real names, addresses, and 
employment histories to rebuff fraud charges to the greatest extent 
possible. 
Second, recruiting current employees or professional journalists 
to conduct undercover investigations might provide important 
protection. Current employees may be better protected as undercover 
investigators because they will have already obtained employment 
truthfully, and so may not be punishable under employment-fraud ag-
gag laws. Recruiting such employees poses serious risks for animal 
rights groups, however. By initiating contact with existing employees 
in an attempt to convince them to surreptitiously record their 
employers, activists would make themselves vulnerable to detection 
by the employer. For that reason, this strategy is likely not a viable 
long-term solution. Better yet, professional journalists could be sent 
into the factory farms to conduct the investigations. By virtue of their 
positions as journalists, they are more clearly protected by the First 
Amendment. However, as Food Lion demonstrates, even this 
protection may be somewhat limited.142 
Lastly, activists’ strongest protection, regardless of the type of 
challenge they may face, is the accuracy of their footage. Undercover 
investigators should take pains to make sure that the legitimacy of 
their documentation is unassailable. Each day’s filming should 
include corporate logos and uniforms, individuals known to work in a 
certain location, and whatever other markers of truth can be found. 
In distributing the footage, activists and their sponsoring 
organizations should refrain from excessive editing or embellishment 
to avoid future allegations that the images were doctored or 
selectively edited. 
 
 140.  Carlson, supra note 106. 
 141.  See H.R. 589, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2012). 
 142.  See supra Part I.B. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Contemporary activists’ undercover films of farm conditions are 
part of a long tradition of undercover journalism exposing health 
issues and animal abuses in livestock facilities.143 And today, just as in 
the past, powerful entities whose profits are threatened by these 
exposés are mounting a major effort to stop activists from making any 
more undercover videos.144 
There is some hope that these laws can be challenged under the 
First Amendment, but in truth, the constitutional defenses against the 
bills are not as strong as some opponents suggest—particularly for the 
agricultural-fraud bills that are emerging as the most successful 
approach. 
In response, activists need to structure their investigations in 
anticipation of future legal challenges. Ultimately, their best hope 
may be that the power of their films sparks congressional action to 
protect whistleblowers on factory farms. 
 
 
 143.  See, e.g., UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1905). 
 144.  See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 106. 
